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Productivity and Unemployment in a Two-Country Model with
Endogenous Growth
by Anton van Schaik and Henri de Groot
Relative to the United States, most European countries have high rates of unemployment
and low levels of productivity in manufacturing. To relate these issues, we develop a
leader-follower model with endogenous growth and dual labour markets, stressing the role
of high-tech and high-wage sectors in trade between countries. The model shows a negative
relation between unemployment and growth. The steady state relative productivity level and
the corresponding rates of unemployment depend on the relative level of fixed costs in the
high-tech sectors of both countries. Downsizing of firms in the leader country raises the
worldwide rate of unemployment, whereas downsizing of firms in the follower country
enlarges the productivity trap.
1. Introduction
The evidence on comparable productivity levels of the advanced industrialized countries
shows a lack of convergence in manufacturing. Broadberry (1996) found that, starting
from the beginning of the second industrial revolution productivity patterns in manufac-
turing can most usefully be characterized as local rather than global convergence'. Van
Ark (1996) reports convergence of productivity levels in manufacturing relative to the
United States over the post World War II period till the end of the 1970s, divergence in
the first half of the 1980s, and stabilization afterwards. Figure 1 shows the development of
relative productivity for the German manufacturing sector, which can serve as an example
for many European countries. The pattern is one of convergence in the 1950s, 1960s and
1970s, divergence in the 1980s, and stabilization of relative productivity in the 1990s.
Bernard and Jones (1996, p.1237), exploring the OECD International Sectoral Database,
concluded that manufacturing does not display the pattern of convergence in labour and
technological productivity found in other sectors'. Other evidence for the 1990s (cf. Pilat,
- 2 -
1996) likewise gives no indications of a renewed period of rising levels of labour produc-
tivity in manufacturing relative to the United States. At the same time, the European rates
of unemployment seem to be stabilizing at high levels, relative to the 1960s and early
1970s (and relative to the United States).
Figure 1. Relative Productivity of Germany (3-year moving average)
Source: Van Ark (1996), Deutsche Bundesbank, and Federal Reserve System
It is the purpose of this paper to relate these issues - persistently high rates of unemploy-
ment and persistently low levels of productivity in manufacturing in a follower country
relative to the leader country - by developing a general equilibrium model focusing on the
linkages between trade, growth, and unemployment. Central to the model is the leader-
follower dichotomy, embodied in a two-country two-sector model with endogenous
growth. Each country has a high-tech high-wage sector producing differentiated and
tradeable goods, and a traditional low-wage sector, producing a homogeneous non-
tradeable good. High-tech firms compete under monopolistic competition, leaving a
potential rent which can be shared with the workers (resulting in a non-competitive wage
differential). The core of the model is an engine of endogenous growth, operating only in
the high-tech sector. Innovation is seen in relation to R&D expenditure which, by
construction, has the capacity to take technological knowledge forward in only small steps.
This idea has been materialized here by an engine of growth driven by intentional R&D in
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both countries. The follower country receives a productivity bonus in the form of a
capacity to imitate the leader. This feature captures the idea that technological change is
the joint outcome of learning activities and intentional activities directed at innovation (cf.
Fagerberg, 1994). Technological change is thus not a free lunch, neither for the leader nor
for the follower country. Follower countries may have a particular advantage in R&D as
they can learn from the leader, but an intentional investment has to be made for techno-
logical progress to occur.
In order to highlight the relation between unemployment and productivity levels
across countries, labour market institutions have to play a role in the model. Up till now,
the relation between endogenous growth and unemployment has not received much atten-
tion in the growth literature. Most of the studies address the issue from a matching
perspective. Equilibrium unemployment results from frictions in the process of matching
the unemployed with vacancies posted by firms. The most comprehensive study in this
field was conducted by Aghion and Howitt (1994). In their model, economic growth
results in creative destruction and accompanying lay-off of workers. Bean and Crafts
(1995) considered the relation between growth and unemployment from a different angle.
In their model, a crucial role is played by the so-called hold-up' problem. The essence of
this problem is that firms have an incentive to underinvest in growth promoting activities
in the presence of trade unions and in the absence of binding contracts. The labour market
of our model deviates from these studies, because our focus is on distortions in the
(effective) supply of labour, whereas the above-mentioned papers focus on distortions in
demand for labour. Furthermore, we model unemployment as resulting from efficiency
wage considerations playing a role in one sector only. This allows us to address the
problem of unemployment in the context of a dual labour market, characterized by
persistent non-competitive wage differentials.
The paper successively discusses the constituent parts of the model. We deliberate-
ly restrict ourselves to the presentation of the equations constituting the final model. The
complete model is presented in the Appendix. The relation between trade and growth is
described in Section 2. This part of the model is self-contained by assuming that R&D
expenditures are determined by some rule of thumb. The labour market is added to the
trade block of the model in Section 3. This part of the model is also self-contained by
assuming that the rate of interest is exogenously given. Section 4 describes the steady-state
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characteristics of the fully fledged model with financial markets determining the rate of
interest and thus the amount of investment in R&D. In Section 5, the model is used to
shed some more light on the empirical issues raised above. Conclusions are presented in
Section 6.
2. Growth and Trade
2.1 Growth
The economy consists of two countries, the leader country (indexed 1), starting with a
(historically inherited) relatively high level of labour productivity, and the follower
country (indexed 2), which lags behind the leader in terms of labour productivity. In each
country, a number of high-tech firms is operating. Monopolistic competition prevails
among these firms. Each firm produces a unique brand of high-tech tradeable goods, but
has only a small share in the world market, so that competition is monopolistically à la
Chamberlin. There is only one homogeneous factor of production, labour, which is
immobile between countries. The growth and trade block of the model is summarized in
Table 1 (equations without a country index hold for each country separately).
< Insert Table 1 around here >
Abstracting from issues of the dynamics of market structure (firms with different produc-
tivity levels), we assume symmetry among high-tech firms within a country so that high-
tech goods produced in one country can simply be represented as a composite good.
Although the assumption of symmetry of the equilibrium is restrictive, such an equilibrium
is easy to analyze and conveys the basic message of the model (see also Peretto, 1996).
Households have a taste for variety. Preferences over varieties are also uniform across
countries and are given by a CES-function (cf. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), with an elasticity
of substitution equal to (>1). World demand for any variety produced in the one country
relative to world demand for any variety produced in the other country depends on the
relative price of these varieties (i.e., the terms of trade). We only need one relation
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(equation 6) to capture trade between the two countries, revealing a negative relation
between the market share of a country in the world market for high-tech goods and the
terms of trade.
The representative high-tech firm of a country producesx units of output, using
direct labourLx that has labour productivityh and efficiencye (equation 1). The efficiency
of a high-tech worker is a variable that can be affected by the wage setting behaviour of
the firm (section 3.1 elaborates on this). The variableh, on the other hand, depends on
international forces and the number of workers employed in the Research and Develop-
ment lab of the firm. Firm-specific knowledge can (by assumption) only be accumulated
through firm- and product-specific R&D. Current research therefore builds on past R&D
experience as measured by firm-specific knowledgeh. Firms employ labourLr in their
research departments to improve the production process and the quality of the product (if
we interpretx as measured in quality units, both forms of innovation can be modelled as
increases inh). There are constant returns in R&D with respect to the level of knowledge
capital, which means that a constant rate of growth can be sustained by allocating a fixed
amount of labour to the research labs (equation 2). Firms also have to incur a traditional
managerial fixed cost before being able to start production. This exogenous managerial
fixed cost (F) is expressed in efficiency units. Each high-tech firm thus has to employ an
amount of labour equal toLf(≡F/e) before being able to produce. High-tech firms
maximize their present discounted profits, which results in a fixed mark-up over labour
costs (equation 3), and a wage rate that is chosen in such a way that it minimizes labour
costs per efficiency unit (i.e., the wage rate satisfies the Solow condition and implies a
constant equilibrium level of efforte; see section 3.1). The price equation shows that real
wages increase with labour productivity. The mark-up is inversely related to the elasticity
of substitution between any two high-tech goods. The closer these goods form substitutes,
i.e., the higher is, the less market power firms have, and the lower the mark-up they can
put on labour costs.
The growth and trade block of the model is self-contained if we assume that firms
employ a fixed proportionβ(>0) of the number of production workers in R&D activities
(equation 4). Implicitly, we thus assume that firms employ research labour according to
some rule of thumb. Section 4 will elaborate on the determination of investments in R&D.
The size of the firm is determined by the process of free entry and exit of firms, resulting
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in zero excess profits (equation 5). The Zero Profit Condition can be written as follows
(combining the equations 1, 3, 4 and 5)
(ZPC)
Production labour and thus high-tech output is positive if the mark-up over wage costs
exceeds the factor 1+β. This can be understood since making profits requires firms to be
able to spread their (managerial) fixed costswTLf and quasi-fixed costswTLr over a
relatively large output. In other words, with large fixed costs and close substitution of
consumption goods, firms need to produce a lot in order to break even. The implication is
that the size of the firm is positively related to the R&D intensityβ. We initially assume
β1=β2, so that the high-tech firms in the two countries only differ in size due to differences
in fixed costsLf.
The returns from firm-specific R&D depend on the productivity of the R&D labs.
They are defined in the following way:
The parameterξ measures the productivity of R&D in both countries. Firms in the
follower country also receive aproductivity bonusas they can copy already existing
technologies. They benefit from general knowledge that spills over from the leader
country. To illustrate the process of trade and growth, the specificationf(d)=d -µ will
suffice. The productivity bonus is positively related to the intensity of international
knowledge spilloversµ, and negatively to the productivity ratiod.
2.2 Trade
The relative productivity leveld (initially smaller than one) is central in our two-country
model. This ratio will increase as long as the follower country grows faster than the leader
country. The relative rate of growth can be deduced from equation 2, which reads
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(applying this equation to each country separately and then dividing)
The last term is obtained after substituting the zero profit condition (using equation 4).
The growth rate of country 1 depends on the number of researchers (measured in
efficiency units) and the productivity of R&D and is constant (given constancy of the
R&D intensity β over time). The growth rate of country 2 also depends on the produc-
tivity bonus. The relative rate of growth therefore depends on the strength of spillovers,
the initial productivity ratio and the relative input of research labour. It is clear that the
relative input of research labour can ultimately be traced back to differences in managerial
fixed costs and effort levels in the high-tech sectors. If the initial relative rate of growth
exceeds one, the follower country catches up with the leader country. The process of
catching up will come to an end if both countries grow at the same rate. The associated
Steady State Locus is (combining all the equations in Table 1)
wherew (≡w2/w1) is the wage ratio,k (≡e2/e1) is the relative effort level and (≡h2/h1) is
(SSL)
the relative productivity level. The relative effort level will be the topic of discussion in
the next section.
To investigate the process of trade and growth, the Steady State Locus should be
confronted with the Temporary Equilibrium Locus, which reads (combining the equations
1 and 3-6)
Behind the dynamics of the model is the mechanism of international trade. It is important
(TEL)
to realize that, according to mark-up pricing, the terms of trade of the follower country
depends positively on the wage ratiow and negatively on the productivity ratiod. The
follower country initially faces a lower productivity level (d<1) and lower wages (w<1)
than the leader country. However, the lower wage ratio cannot fully compensate for the
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difference in labour productivity; consequently, the price of the high-tech good of the
follower country is higher than the price of the high-tech good of the leader country. The
follower country will experience an increase in market share in the world market for high-
tech goods if it is able to increase the productivity ratio and thus to lower the terms of
trade. This will always be the case if µ> -1. As Figure 2 reveals, in this case, the Steady
State Locus slopes downwards, so that the model is stable.1 A relatively high value of µ
implies more international knowledge spillovers, so that there is more room for price
decreases in the follower country. A relatively low value of indicates that the (bundle
of) product varieties supplied by the follower country are substantially differentiated from
those supplied by the leader country, so that the follower country can relatively easily
compete on the world market for high-tech goods (despite the lower productivity and
higher prices as compared to the leader country).
Figure 2. Trade and Growth
The diagram depicts the dynamic evolution of two countries that differ in two respects.
Country 2 initially lags behind country 1. Furthermore, high-tech firms in country 2 are
characterized by lower fixed costs (F2<F1). The development of the productivity ratio is
driven by two factors. It is positively affected by backwardness', and negatively by the
relatively small amount of research labour (measured in efficiency units) in country 2. In
1 The SSL slopes upwards if -1>µ. A relatively large value of implies small differences in
varieties, so that there is much competition by prices. In this case, the model is stable if TEL intersects SSL
from below.
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the diagram, the positive backwardness' effect dominates initially, resulting in catching
up. Ultimately, a steady state is reached in which the positive backwardness' effect is
exactly offset by the negative relative research labour' effect. Starting from some initial
productivity ratio (point S), the economy will move along the temporary equilibrium locus
towards the point where SSL and TEL intersect (point E). The steady-state relative
productivity level can be written as
The diagram exhibits a productivity trap (d*<1). According to our model, the productivity
trap can be traced back to persisting higher fixed costs of the high-tech sector in the leader
country relative to fixed costs in the follower country. (The assumption of high fixed costs
in country 1, relative to fixed costs in country 2, is justified by empirical observations on
differences between the US and Europe; see Section 5.) In the steady state the two coun-
tries will grow at the same pace, but at different levels of productivity. Wages in the
follower country are higher (w*>1) and productivity is lower (d*<1) than in the leader
country. The outcome for relative productivity is independent of the total level of output
and employment. The dichotomy between the process of trade and growth and the
establishment of labour market equilibrium depends on the assumption that investment in
R&D is determined according to some rule of thumb. This assumption will be relaxed in
section 4. First, we turn to the determination of the allocation of labour.
3. The Allocation of Labour
3.1 Employment
Each country has two sectors, a traditional non-tradeables sector and a high-tech tradeables
sector. The non-tradeables sector is included for various reasons. First of all, it is import-
ant from an empirical point of view, as sheltered sectors constitute a large part of the
economy (this point is forcefully made in, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996).
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Secondly, we want to stress the coincidence of imperfect competition in product markets
and wage differentials in labour markets (cf. OECD Jobs Study, 1994). We therefore need
two distinct sectors that make up the economy. Tradeability of traditional goods has to be
excluded as this makes full specialization possible. The allocation of labour is described in
Table 2.
< Insert Table 2 around here >
The non-tradeables sector has constant labour productivityA (=y/LN). LN stands for the
number of workers employed in this sector andy is the production of non-tradeables. In
the remainder, we assume unitary labour productivity in both countries (equation 7). We
thereby implicitly assume full and instantaneous convergence in this sector. This reflects
the idea that relatively basic techniques are used in the sheltered sector of the economy,
the technology of which diffuses easily across advanced countries. Comparative advantage
and returns to specialization play no role in this sector, in contrast to the high-tech
tradeables sector (see also Bernard and Jones (1996) for an empirical justification of this
assumption). Under perfect competition, the price of a traditional good equals labour costs
(equation 8). The high-tech tradeables sector has already been discussed in section 2. Each
firm employs direct and indirect labour (Lx+Lr+Lf), which has efficiencye. The efficiency
of a high-tech worker is a variable that can be affected by the wage setting behaviour of
the firm. Following Akerlof (1982), we assume that the efficiency of an employee in the
high-tech sector depends on the wage he earns, related to the wage of an employee in the
traditional sector. Firms will pay higher wages as long as the increase in benefits related
to the increase in efficiency more than offsets the increase in costs in the form of a higher
wage bill. This trade off results in the well-known Solow condition (see Appendix). Given
our specification of the efficiency wage relation (equation 12), this implies that the relative
wage (equation 13) and the level of effort are constant in equilibrium. The introduction of
the efficiency wage relation leads to high-tech employees receiving a non-competitive
wage differential (wT/wN>1).
Consumption in a country consists of the traditional good of that country along
with all varieties of the high-tech good. Households have Cobb-Douglas preferences over
the two types of goods (a fixed fraction of consumption expendituresσ is spent on high-
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tech goods). Preferences between traditional and high-tech goods are assumed to be
identical across countries. For each country, it can then be derived that goods market
equilibrium is described by a fixed ratio between the consumption of traditional goods and
the consumption of high-tech goods. We assume that financial capital is immobile across
countries. The absence of international capital flows implies that trade must be balanced at
every moment in time. Trade balance requires that the value of output of high-tech goods
be equal to the value of consumption of high-tech goods. Goods market equilibrium is
then described by equation 9, which reads (after substituting the equations 1, 2, 7 and 8)
Notice that the relative wage is fixed by efficiency wage considerations (equation 13) and
that 0<σ<1 and >1. Thus, for a given number of high-tech firmsn, there is a fixed
positive relation between employment in the non-tradeables sector and the number of
production workers in the high-tech sector. What this equation basically says is that, for
the circular flow to be in equilibrium, an increase in the number of high-tech production
workers must be accompanied by an increase in employment in the traditional sector.
Employment in the high-tech sector is described by equation 10. Using the Zero
Profit Condition (and equation 4), this equation can be written as
Employment in the high-tech sector exceeds the number of production workers by the
extent of the mark-up. This is intuitively clear as a large mark-up implies that firms can
afford relatively high fixed costs. The allocation of labour now follows from the solution
of the number of production workers. To get a quick glance at the characteristics of the
equilibrium, unemployment is left out of consideration (U=0). In this case, the labour
market is in equilibrium if total labourL (which is fixed) is fully allocated over both
sectors. After substituting the equations forLN and LT into the equation for labour market
equilibrium (equation 11), the result is
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The full employment equilibrium number of high-tech production workers is fixed, the
implication being that the sectoral allocation of labour is also fixed. In the full employ-
ment equilibrium the allocation of labour only depends on the parameters andσ the
(rigid) relative wage. The full employment equilibrium number of high-tech firms now
follows (using the zero profit condition) as
This equation shows that the number of high-tech firms (i.e., product variety) crucially
depends on the ratio betweenL and Lf. A decrease in the supply of labourL reduces the
number of firms. However, this does not affect the allocation of labour over sectors. A
decrease inL is proportionally spread over sectors because the size of the high-tech firms
is fixed by the process of entry and exit of firms (given constancy of the R&D intensity
β).
3.2 Unemployment
We now introduce unemployment (U>0) by explicitly modelling the flows on the labour
market. We have seen that labour gets a state-specific' payment (wN or wT when
employed in one of the two sectors). Unemployed people receive a real unemployment
compensation equal tob, expressed in terms of the non-tradeable good. Consequently, the
nominal compensation equalsbwN. This compensation is paid out of lump-sum taxes on
labour income. It is assumed that the net real wage earned in the non-tradeables sector is
higher than the real unemployment compensation, so that the unemployment compensation
b must be sufficiently smaller than one. In principle, each worker is striving for the
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highest possible pay-off. Hence, all workers would like to be employed in the high-tech
sector. The number of jobs in this sector is, however, limited. We assume that at some
exogenous rateδ jobs in the high-tech sector become available. Upon being laid off, a
worker faces two options. He can either decide to take a job in the traditional sector (these
jobs are freely available), or he can join the pool of unemployed. In determining his
optimal strategy, the worker has to take the following factors into consideration: (i)
unemployment benefits are lower than the salaries in the traditional sector (b<1), and (ii)
the inflow rate into the high-tech sector from the traditional sectorαq is lower than from
unemploymentq. The process of weighing the two options that laid off high-tech workers
face results in an endogenously determined probability,η, of entering one of the two
states (i.e., the state of unemployment or traditional sector employment). The outcome for
this probability is such that, ex-ante, laid off workers (who are distributed randomly) are
indifferent between the two options they face. The resulting unemployment is both
voluntary and involuntary. The unemployed are willing to work in the high-tech sector at
the going wage, while they refuse jobs at the going wage in the traditional sector.2
2 Labour market equilibrium is derived by introducing three value functions. These functions (Vj)
indicate the present discounted value for a worker of being in statej (=T, N, U for being employed in the
tradeables sector, non-tradeables sector and being unemployed, respectively)
rVT wT δη(VN VT) δ(1 η)(VU VT) , rVN wN αq(VT VN) , rVU bwN q(VT VU)
Equilibrium requiresVN=VU. Flow equilibrium on the labour market (i.e., a constant allocation of labour)
requires δηLT=αqLN and δ(1-η)LT=qU. We refer to the Appendix for a more detailed description and
derivation of labour market equilibrium.
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Figure 3. Labour Market Flows
Figure 3 presents a stylized interpretation of the labour market flows. The assumption that
the unemployed have a higher inflow rate into the high-tech sector than workers in the
traditional sector (α<1) is important and often used as a simple and useful working
hypothesis in the literature on unemployment in dual labour markets. Though not formally
modelled, this may reflect that it is harder to find a high-tech job when employed in the
secondary sector than when unemployed. Alternatively, people may vary in their aversion
to working in the secondary sector. This simplified account of the labour market captures
some crucial perceptions of labour market equilibrium (cf. Layard, Nickell and Jackman,
1991).
Formally, flow-equilibrium in the labour market is determined by three value
functions (denoting the present discounted value of expected income streams of a worker
in the traditional sector, an unemployed labourer, and a worker in the high-tech sector,
respectively) and two flow-equilibrium conditions, guaranteeing a constant allocation of
labour over the three states (cf. De Groot, 1996; see also the Appendix). In equilibrium, it
is required that the value of a job in the traditional sector equals the value of being
unemployed. This captures the idea that a laid-off high-tech worker is indifferent between
accepting a job in the traditional sector and being unemployed. Workers discount their
income at a rate of interestr (to be specified in the next section) as they can freely save
and borrow in the financial market at this rate. The equilibrium number of unemployed
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can be derived as
where q represents the outflow rate out of unemployment (which equals the inflow rate
into the high-tech sector for the unemployed). The rate of unemployment is positively
related to the total number of high-tech workers. This can be understood as follows. As
more high-tech jobs become available, the number of high-tech jobs opening up as a result
of lay-off increases. For a given outflow rate from the pool of unemployed, this increases
the attractiveness of waiting for a high-tech job as an unemployed job seeker. The
unemployment rate will rise accordingly. The outflow rate ispositively related to the rate
of interest. This results from the fact that a lower rate of interest decreases the importance
attached to current payments. This increases the attractiveness of waiting for a high-wage
job in the pool of unemployed and consequently lowers the outflow rate out of unemploy-
ment.
We are now able to determine the allocation of labour over employment and the
state of unemployment (conditional on the rate of interestand the R&D intensityβ). The
allocation of labour follows from the solution of the number of high-tech firms, which
reads as follows
This result is analogous to the previously derived equation for the number of firms in the
case of full employment (as can be verified by puttingα=δ=0). A decrease in the rate of
interest will decrease the number of firms. As the size of a firm is fixed (given constancy
of the R&D intensityβ), employment in both sectors will decrease so that unemployment
will rise. The model thus reveals anegativerelation between unemployment and the rate
of interest (conditional on the R&D intensityβ). This can be explained as follows. A
lower rate of interest increases the importance attached to future payments. As becoming
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unemployed improves the chance of acquiring a high-wage job in the near future, this
becomes more attractive. Thus more people opt for unemployment than for a low-wage
job in the traditional sector (which decreases the outflow rate out of unemployment). This
reduces the effective supply of labourL-U, which spreads proportionally over sectors (both
LT and LN decrease). The markets become thinner', so that there is less room for high-
tech firms to spread fixed costs over output. As a consequence, some firms will have to
exit.
If we assume (as is the case in the savings-investment equilibrium in our model;
see section 4.1) that the rate of interest is positively related to the rate of growth, the
model shows that catching up with the leader country is accompanied by rising rates of
unemployment in the follower country. We refer to the example in Figure 2. Starting from
a relatively low productivity level in point S, the follower country converges to the
productivity trap E. The productivity bonus gradually decreases in size, so that the
follower country faces a slowdown in the rate of growth (and the rate of interest). The
decrease in the rate of interest decreases the outflow rate out of unemployment, because a
larger number of people opt for unemployment than for a job in the low-wage sector of
the economy. In point E, the follower country arrives at a steady-state equilibrium, where
the allocation of labour does not change any more. In the next section, we will endogenize
the rate of interest (and consequently the R&D intensityβ), so that we can investigate the
relation between the equilibrium relative productivity level and the equilibrium rate of
unemployment. Attention will be restricted to a steady-state analysis.
4. The Steady State
4.1 Savings and Investment
Financial markets determine the relation between the rate of growth and the rate of
interest. We recall that it is assumed that financial capital is immobile between countries.
The absence of international capital flows implies that trade is balanced. This requires the
value of output of high-tech goods to be equal to the value of consumption of high-tech
goods. The value of consumption is therefore equal to the value of output of both sectors
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(ypN+nxpT). Households receive wage income (wNLN+wTLT) and dividends. Dividends are
paid from the difference between the value of output of high-tech goods (xpx) and produc-
tion costs (nwT(Lx+Lf)). Households save and high-tech firms invest (nwTLr). Savings are
the difference between households’ income and the value of consumption. Noting that
ypN=wNLN, we can easily check that the circular flow is in equilibrium if savings equal
investment.
< Insert Table 3 around here >
To model savings and investment behaviour, we follow Smulders and Van de Klundert
(1995). Households maximize intertemporal utility, which yields the familiar Ramsey rule
(equation 15). This equation relates the growth of consumption to the determinants of the
consumption-savings decision. It shows that the rate of growth is high if the return on
savings (r) is large relative to the subjective discount rate (θ), and if households are
willing to substitute intertemporally (1/ρ is high). High-tech firms determine their optimal
research effort, which leads to the planned rate of growth (equation 14). Confrontation of
the required rate of growth (the Ramsey rule) with the planned rate of growth yields the
steady-state interest rate and rate of growth3
The steady-state rate of growth does not depend on the sectoral allocation of labour. What
matters for growth are consumers’ preferences, the productivity of the research labs
(which for the follower country embodies the productivity bonus) and the level of fixed
3 Stability of the steady state equilibrium with positive growth requires the following parameter
restrictions:σ(ρ-1)> -1 and ( -1)zeLf>θ.
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costs (measured in efficiency units).4 The model is completed by determining the steady-
state R&D intensityβ, which equals the present discounted value of the growth rate (equa-
tion 18).
4.2 Comparative Static Analysis
We define a (global) steady state as a situation in which both the rates of growth and the
relative productivity level are constant. The steady-state relative productivity level is then
determined as
This result is already known from the growth and trade block of the model (section 2):
persisting differences in productivity levels between countries can ultimately be traced
back to persisting differences in relative management costs (measured in efficiency units)
of the high-tech sectors (under the assumption of equal preference parameters in both
countries).
We are now able to derive comparative static results. Table 4 shows the effects of
an increase in the fixed cost requirement in both countries (F and thusLf increases). An
increase in the fixed costs of the high-tech firms in the leader country will lead to exit of
firms. The remaining firms are bigger in size and can afford larger R&D labs so that
productivity growth is raised. As a consequence, the relative productivity level decreases.
In the leader country, more firms leave the market than in the follower country. This is
4 The independence of the rate of growth from the scale of the economy as represented byL is
important in the light of the ongoing discussion on the relevance of scale effects that characterize so many of
the endogenous growth models (e.g., Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991)). We refer here to Jones
(1995a) for an extensive discussion on this issue. Based on time-series evidence, Jones (1995b) draws the
conclusion that the prediction of ’scale effects’ is inconsistent with empirical evidence for industrialized
countries. He therefore proposes a modified version of the Romer model in which the long-run growth rate is
crucially dependent on the rate of population growth. The model in this paper presents an alternative way to
overcome the ’problem’ of scale effects (see Smulders and Van de Klundert, 1995). A difference between
this model and the Jones model is that parameters influencing savings behaviour like the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and the subjective discount rate determine the rate of growth in our model, whereas
they play no role in the Jones model.
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caused by the fact that firms in the follower country benefit from the increase in the
productivity bonus (d is lower), so that they have to invest less in R&D (in country 2, the
increase inLr is smaller than in country 1). At the same time, the higher rate of interest
decreases unemployment in both countries (more people opt for a job in the traditional
sector than for unemployment). Growth and unemployment are thus negatively related. In
the leader country the higher rate of growth is accompanied by a higher level of output of
the tradeables sector, whereas in the follower country output of tradeables is lower.
< Insert Table 4 around here >
An increase in the fixed costs of the high-tech firms in the follower country has no effects
on worldwide growth and interest rates, so that the allocation of labour over sectors and
unemployment does not change. The follower country has no impact on the rate of
growth, because there are no knowledge spillovers from the follower to the leader country.
An increase in fixed costs leads to exit of firms, so that there is more room to invest in
R&D. This raises the relative productivity level. Thus, to keep the same growth rate as in
country 1, firms in country 2 also have to invest more in R&D, because the productivity
bonus decreases.
Labour market policies leave the long-run rate of growth and relative productivity
unaffected in our model. This result is due to the assumption of free entry and exit in the
high-tech sector.5 Unemployment compensations do, however, affect the allocation of
labour and the level of production. More concretely, lowering unemployment benefits
increases the outflow rate out of unemployment, as the costs of waiting for a high-wage
job are increased. More people are willing to accept a job in the traditional sector, so
production of non-tradeable goods increases. The increased purchasing power of con-
sumers in the economy will positively affect the profitability of high-tech firms and induce
firms to enter this sector. As the size of an individual firm is fixed, high-tech employment
will increase. Equilibrium unemployment will have fallen.
5 Solving the model under the alternative assumption that the number of high-tech firms is exogenous-
ly given (leaving potential excess profits) results in a negative relation between, for example, unemployment
benefits and growth. This is illustrated in a simplified version of the current model (with exogenous R&D
intensity, a fixed number of firms, and no intertemporal considerations of the workers in their decision how
to allocate when laid off in the high-tech sector (De Groot and Van Schaik, 1997)).
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5. The Productivity Trap
The theoretical model developed in this paper can serve as a useful framework to address
the connection between productivity and unemployment. In the current section, we will
show how parts of a rich, descriptive body of literature can be reconciled with some
simple, basic ideas present in our model. This exercise can deepen our understanding of
some (stylized) empirical facts.
Following World War II, for more than 30 years, many European countries
experienced high rates of growth of industrial productivity, strongly exceeding the US
performance. This development was parallelled by historically unprecedented low rates of
unemployment in the 1950s and 1960s, whereas the 1970s were characterized by an
upsurge in European unemployment rates. Important elements in explaining these
developments are a huge potential to catch up with the US in the early post war period,
along with the establishment of a generous European welfare system, starting in the late
1960s (cf. De Groot and Van Schaik, 1997). Since the late 1980s, European productivity
levels relative to the US have been stabilizing at levels lower than those reached at the
end of the 1970s, whereas unemployment has been structurally higher. How can these two
features be reconciled?
Figure 4. A Change in the Productivity Trap
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The stabilization of unemployment rates (at relatively high levels in Europe and relatively
low levels in the US) is indicative of the arrival of a period of steady growth. Two
important phenomena point in this direction. First, there is the stabilization of relative
productivity levels. Secondly, relative wages in manufacturing are stabilizing at levels
corresponding to these relative productivity levels. Nominal wages in the European indus-
tries (more specifically, in Germany and France) are significantly above those in the US.6
Figure 4 crudely mimics the empirical evidence, with point E representing the situation at
the end of the 1970s, and point E’ representing the situation in the 1990s. The remainder
of this section will focus on (i) why European countries lag behind the US, and (ii) why
the productivity gap was enlarged in the 1980s (i.e., in terms of the diagram, what caused
the upward shift of the temporary equilibrium locus).
We have seen that persisting differences in productivity levels between countries
can be traced back to persisting differences in relative management costs (measured in
efficiency units) of the growth-generating high-tech, high-wage sectors of the economy.
The relative productivity level will decrease if relative management costs decrease. In
addition, as has become clear from the comparative static analysis in the previous section,
the effects on the equilibrium rate of unemployment will depend on the causes of the
change in the equilibrium productivity ratio. A decrease in the management costs of the
leader country will increase unemployment in both countries, whereas a decrease in the
management costs of follower country 2 leaves unemployment unaffected.
Traditional fixed costs are higher in the US industries than in Europe. Gordon
(1994) shows that the ratio of managers/administrators to clerical, service and production
workers in the US is about four times as large in the US than in Germany or France. In
addition, non-competitive wage differentials are more pronounced in the US than in
European countries (cf. Hartog, Van Opstal and Teulings, 1997). The difference in
management costs results, according to our model, in relatively large firms in the US. This
allows them to spend relatively much on R&D, resulting in a structural lead in terms of
6 This follows from calculations of hourly wages in manufacturing, using OECD National Accounts
(at current exchange rates). Nominal wages in France and Germany in 1980 were already higher than those
in the US (point E in Figure 3). Relative wages in these countries dropped below 1 in the early 1980s, in
order to recover in the second half of the 1980s and to exceed those of the US again. In the early 1990s,
relative wages exceeded those of the late 1970s (corresponding to point E’ in Figure 4). Other sources
confirm this development of relative wages (cf. Leamer, 1996).
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productivity over Europe.
The literature has paid a great deal of attention to the causes of the structural
difference in fixed (management) costs between Europe and the US. Most US firms grew
mature in a tradition of mass production (cf. Nelson and Wright, 1992). This is in strong
contrast with Europe. Broadberry (1996, p. 340) summarizes the literature on this point by
arguing that The greater prevalence of mass production in the USA can be explained by
both demand and supply factors. On the demand side, standardization in the USA was
facilitated by the existence of a large, homogeneous home market in the USA compared
with fragmented national markets stratified by class differences in Europe, coupled with
greater reliance on differentiated export markets. On the supply side, resource-intensive
American machinery could not be adopted on the same scale in Europe, where resource
costs were considerably higher.'
According to Lazonick (1991), US firms could afford a high fixed cost strategy. In
Lazonick’s theory, fixed costs play a central role. Fixed costs are a problem for the firms
as they face uncertainty on both the demand and the supply side. On the other hand, fixed
costs are a strategic variable. By investing in a low fixed cost strategy, the organization is
certain that unit costs are relatively insensitive to the scale of production. In contrast to
this adaptive strategy, a firm can choose an innovative strategy. Such a strategy is
characterized by strongly decreasing unit costs when production expands. An innovative
strategy may result in product or process innovation. However, there is uncertainty
involved as the high fixed costs have to be transformed into low unit costs. According to
Lazonick, investments in specialized facilities for research, development, and marketing,
and in managerial bureaucracy play an important role. Following the world wide recession
in the early 1980s, European firms adopted a more adaptive strategy, hampering innova-
tions in production, organization, and marketing. Competing on the world market
consequently became more and more difficult, in a period in which, in addition, trans-
portation and communication costs decreased dramatically. A radical strategic change was
needed to survive. A process of downsizing' started, which characterizes most of the
strategic policies pursued by firms operating on the world market.
The emphasis on cost reduction and improving efficiency started a process of
reducing fixed costs, resulting into reductions of the size of the firm (downsizing). This
induces entry of new firms and reduces each firm’s market share, which results in smaller
- 23 -
R&D departments. In our model, the reduction in number of managers (Lf) and research
workers (Lr) together induces an equal decline in the number of production workers (Lx).
Consequently the so-called bureaucratic burden (which can be defined asLf/Lx) increases
(see Appendix). This is in accordance with empirical evidence (cf. Gordon, 1996). Not
only European but also US firms are adopting strategies aimed at cost reduction and
efficiency improvements (cf. McKinsey, 1996). The lower relative productivity levels in
the 1990s compared with the late 1970s point to a stronger reduction in fixed costs in
Europe than in the US (according to our model). Downsizing in Europe, in our model,
results in an increase of the productivity gap with the US. This reduces the market share
of European firms in the world market. Reduction in fixed costs in the leader country
retards economic growth, resulting in a world-wide increase in unemployment. Hence, part
of the European unemployment problem can be traced back to strategic behaviour of US
firms aimed at reducing fixed costs.7
6. Conclusion
The performance of the European and the US economies is significantly different in terms
of productivity and unemployment. We argued in this paper that in part these differences
can be traced back to institutional differences. More concretely, differences between
countries in fixed costs of firms competing on the world market for high-tech goods were
shown to be important determinants of growth and relative productivity levels. A positive
relation between these costs and R&D intensities was established. Downsizing by means
of reducing these fixed costs thus negatively affects economic growth.
Another important characteristic of our model is the negative relation between
7 A characteristic of our model is that the world rate of growth is ultimately determined by the leader
country. This is due to our assumption of one-sided knowledge spill-overs. Relaxation of this assumption
would alter this result, but not affect the general tendencies sketched in this section. Another consideration is
that by the assumption of free entry in the high-tech sector, labour market institutions do not affect the rate
of growth (and the relative productivity level). We are convinced that institutional differences play an
important role in explaining the empirical tendencies that are central in this paper. Our main focus in this
paper is, however, on differences in the strategies pursued by individual firms as reflected in the fixed costs.
In order not to complicate the analysis more than necessary, we abstain from an analysis of the model under
blocked entry. We refer to De Groot and Van Schaik (1997) for an analysis that focuses on labour market
institutions and their effect on growth and the productivity gap.
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growth and unemployment. The unemployed face a trade off between accepting a job in
the low wage (sheltered) sector and remaining unemployed, enhancing the probability of
finding a high-wage job in the open sector of the economy in the near future. A lower rate
of growth (and the accompanied lower rate of interest) increases unemployment as it
increases the value attached to future payments. Waiting as an unemployed person for a
high wage job becomes more attractive.
This paper did not focus on differences in labour market institutions between
Europe and the US. However, most analyses of the European unemployment problem (cf.
OECD Jobs Study, 1994) focus on these differences. Notwithstanding the importance of
labour market institutions, the processes of trade and growth create their own dynamics,
which may have important consequences for the labour market. These processes have to
be taken into account when studying the European unemployment problem. This paper is
an attempt to integrate these issues within a consistent framework. If downsizing remains
an important trend in a globalizing world economy, the limited possibilities for firms to
engage in in house' R&D will further retard economic growth. The associated reduction
in interest rates reduces the costs of waiting as an unemployed person for attractive jobs,
so that a further upward pressure on unemployment will result. Although, in our simple
model, downsizing in Europe has no impact on the world wide rate of growth, it will
increase the productivity gap with the US. Summarizing, the disappointing developments
on European labour markets since the late 1970s can in part be traced back to develop-
ments in the US. Downsizing seems to have played a crucial role both in retarding
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Lx, Lr, ḣ, x, pT, wT
Explanation of symbols
β = R&D intensity;
= price elasticity of high-tech goods ( >1);
e = effort level;
h = labour productivity high-tech sector;
Lf = fixed labour high-tech firm;
Lr = research labour high-tech firm;
Lx = production labour high-tech firm;
pT = price high-tech good;
x = output high-tech firm;
wT = nominal wage rate high-tech sector;
z = productivity of R&D.
8 The system consists of 11 equations and 12 unknowns. Given initial values forh1 andh2, the system
can be solved for all real variables and relative prices. The characteristics of the steady state, in whichh2/h1
is a constant (and endogenously determined), are discussed in section 4.2.
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y, n, e, pN, wN, LN, LT, U
Explanation of symbols
a, c, γ = parameters efficiency wage relation;
σ = share of consumption expenditures spent on high-tech goods (0<σ<1);
L = total labour supply (exogenous);
LN = employment non-tradeables sector;
LT = employment tradeables sector;
n = number of high-tech firms;
U = unemployment;
wN = nominal wage rate non-tradeables sector.
9 For each country the system consists of 7 equations and 8 unknowns. AssumingU=0, the system
can be solved in terms of the ratio between the total amount of labourL and the number of production
workersLx. The number of production workers (size of the firm) is determined by the zero profit condition
(given constancy of the R&D intensityβ.) AssumingU>0, an additional equation is needed, representing
flow equilibrium on the labour market. Imposing the parameter restriction 0<γ<1 anda>(1-γ)c>0 yields an
equilibrium relative wage larger than one.
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g, r , β
Explanation of symbols
1/ρ = intertemporal elasticity of substitution (ρ>1);
θ = subjective discount rate;
g = rate of growth;
r = rate of interest.
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Table 4. Comparative static results
Effects of increase in
F1 F2
Country 1 2 1 2
r rate of interest + +
g rate of growth + +
β R&D intensity + +
Lr research labour ++ + +
Lx production labour ++ + +
Lf fixed labour + +
LT/n firm size ++ + +
q outflow rate out of unemployment + +
n number of firms -- - -
LT employment tradeables + +
LN employment non-tradeables + +
wT/wN wage differential
e effort
U unemployment - -
d productivity ratio - +
f(d) productivity bonus + -
p terms of trade + -
w wage ratio + -
x output per firm + - +
nx total output tradeables + - +
Note: Effects which are equal for both countries are denoted by a single- or + . A double sign (-- or ++)
indicates that the effects are larger in size for the country in question than for the other country.
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Appendix
This Appendix will in turn describe consumer behaviour, producer behaviour, and labour market equilibrium
in the two countries. Then the steady-state solution of the model will be derived. Where it leads to no
confusion, country indices (j=1, 2) and time indices are omitted (equations hold for both countries in this
case). Unless otherwise stated, symbols are defined in the main text and in Tables 1-3.
Consumer behaviour.
We assume that consumers maximize their intertemporal utilityU0 in three steps. In the first step, they
decide how to divide total income among savings on the one hand and consumption on the other. In the
second step they decide how to divide total consumption expenditures among high-tech goods on the one
hand and traditional goods on the other. In the final step they decide how to divide their expenditures on the
high-tech goods among then1+n2 varieties of this good that are available to them. In thefirst step the
consumer maximizes
C being a composite good, subject to
(A.1)
where CPC is total expenditures on consumption goods andI is total wage income in the economy. The
(A.2)
current value Hamiltonian corresponding to this problem equals




From the FOC (A.4) we derive
(A.5)
Combining (A.5) and (A.6), these equations yields
(A.6)
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HereXPX represents expenditures on the differentiated high-tech good. This yields the following Lagrangian
(A.9)




Eliminating ν results in
(A.12)
This equation tells us that a fixed fraction1-σ of total consumption expenditureCPC is spent on traditional
(A.13)
goods and a fixed fractionσ is spent on high-tech goods. Combining these equations with the Cobb-Douglas
preference function gives an expression for the price indexPC





gives the following Lagrangian
(A.16)
whereι represents the shadow-price associated with the budget constraint, andci is the consumed quantity of
(A.17)
variety i of the high-tech good. The FOC to this problem is
We now assume symmetry of goods producedwithin a country. From the FOC it then follows that
(A.18)
wherecj
k is the consumed quantity in countryk of a good produced in countryj. We can thus derive
(A.19)
The respective consumed quantities are thus
(A.20)





1X1 and combining with the above expressions
(A.21)
yields the solution forPX
1:
Similarly, we derive for country 2:
(A.22)
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2) so we get
and
(A.24)
so we can derive
(A.25)




High-tech firms compete monopolistically. Each firm, producing a unique brand of the high-tech good, is
assumed to maximize its present discounted value
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wherephi is the shadow price of the level of technologyhi. The FOC of this maximization problem are
(A.34)







Equation (A.37) yields the optimal R&D input
(A.39)
Equation (A.38) is the dynamic equation governing the allocation of high-tech labour over time. Using
(A.40)
equation (A.36) and (A.37) and rewriting yields
Finally, substituting equations (A.36) and (A.37) in equation (A.35) we get the Solow conditon
(A.41)
Using the Solow condition and the efficiency wage relation (A.30), we derive the equilibrium relative wage
(A.42)
and the equilibrium level of effort as





We introduce three value functions (Bellman equations),VN, VU, and VT, denoting the present discounted
value of expected income streams of a worker in the traditional sector, an unemployed person, and a worker
in the high-tech sector, respectively. The worker in the traditional sector enjoys a wage rate ofwN fr m
working and he expects in unit time to get a job in the high-tech sector with probabilityαq, which gives him
a surplus ofVT-VN over his current position.VN thus satisfies






For equilibrium to hold, we require throughout that the value of a job in the traditional sector equals the
(A.48)
value of being unemployed
We impose two flow-equilibrium conditions, guaranteeing a constant allocation of labour over the three
(A.49)
states




so total labour supply (L) is either employed in one of the two sectors or unemployed. Using the equations
(A.53)
(A.46)-(A.53), we can derive the outflow rate out of unemployment and the number of unemployed as a
function of r, wT, wN, and the parametersb, α, andδ
(A.54)
The steady-state solution of the model
The model is solved under the assumption that excess profits are zero
Using the mark-up relation (A.39) and the production function of high-tech firms (A.29), this can be
rewritten as
A steady state is a situation in which relative productivity, the growth rates in the two countries, the
(A.56)
allocation of labour and the number of high-tech firms are constant. In the steady state it holds that
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In addition, from equations (A.8) and (A.14), it can be derived that the steady-state circular flow is
(A.57)
characterized by
Using these expressions, and taking the price of the non-tradeable good in country 1 as numeraire (pN
1=1) we
(A.58)
can rewrite the (steady-state) Ramsey rule (A.7) as
By the choice of the numeraire, the wages in both countries are constant in the steady state. So both the
(A.59)
price of high-tech goods (pT) and the shadow price of investment in R&D (ph) decline at the rateg. Using
this in combination with the rate of growth (A.31), and combining (A.39)-(A.41) we can deriveLx=r/ξe, and
Lr=g/ξe. Substituting these expressions into the zero-profit condition (A.56) and rewriting yields the planned
rate of growth as
Confronting the Ramsey rule with the planned rate of growth gives the steady-state solution for the savings-
(A.60)
investment equilibrium according to which10
As relative productivity is constant in the steady state (implyingg1=g2), we can derive the steady-state
(A.61)
relative productivity leveld* as
Finally, we have to determine the steady-state allocation of labour. The size of high-tech firms immediately
(A.62)
follows from the zero-profit condition (A.56) and the solution of the equilibrium interest rate (A.61)
Using (A.13), (A.29), (A.39), (A.44), (A.45), andLx=r/ξe, we can derive
(A.63)
10 Stability of the model requiresσ(ρ-1)> -1. An economically meaningful steady state equilibrium is
characterized by positive growth and interest rates for which it should hold that ( -1)zeLf>θ.
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Substituting (A.52), (A.54), and (A.64) into (A.53), and using the solution for the firm size (A.63), we can
(A.64)
solve for the equilibrium number of high-tech firms
where β≡Lr/Lx=g/r is derived using (A.61),wT/wN is given by (A.43), and the equilibrium interest rate by
(A.65)
(A.61). From this solution forn, we can solve for the equilibrium levels of employmentLT and LN, and for
the number of unemployedU.
The ratioLf/Lx (’the bureaucratic burden’) equals
It immediately follows that∂(Lf/Lx)/∂F<0.
(A.66)
